Abstract: WorkFlow Management Systems (WFMS) coordinate and streamline business processes. Acquiring workflow authorisations and managing workflow authorisation constraints is a challenging problem. Current WFMSs assume a centralised global workflow authorisation model. In this paper, we propose a distributed workflow authorisation model with no central authorisation manager for a mediator-free environment. We provide an on-demand task discovery protocol that enables domains to discover tasks available in other domains. We formulate the workflow authorisation problem as a constraint satisfaction problem to select access paths that satisfy all the workflow authorisation constraints. We propose the Workflow Minimal Authorisation Problem (WMAP), which selects minimal authorisations required to execute the workflow tasks. In addition, we investigate access path overlaps to allow tasks in the same session to share authorisations and we present the Workflow Minimal Authorisation Problem with path Overlaps (WMAPO). Finally, we formulate integer programmes to solve both the WMAP and WMAPO.
Introduction
Globalisation has removed the barriers between markets, organisations, researchers and societies. In such a connected world, there are immense possibilities of collaboration in distributed environments. In recent years, WorkFlow Management Systems (WFMSs) have gained importance in both business and research fields (Shankar et al., 2005; Stohr and Zhao, 2001) . WFMSs are designed to automate processes by efficiently coordinating and controlling the flow of work between participants. The need for WFMSs is essential as enterprises are continuously splitting processes into several tasks and migrating such tasks across organisational boundaries to combine their efforts and become virtual enterprises (Afsarmanesh et al., 1998; Desai and Awad, 2005; Ludwig et al., 1999; Ramnath and Landsbergen, 2005) . Furthermore, in recent years, there has been an increasing demand for scientific workflows (Altintas et al., 2004; Franklin and Liu, 2004) to allow scientific institutions to collaborate in the management and analysis of the vast quantities of data generated by their scientific experiments.
Such large-scale workflows will involve the collaboration of several distributed entities across several domains. A domain is a separate, autonomous entity that manages a group of resources, provides services and is capable of performing several tasks. Domains have their own administration and access control polices. Acquiring the authorisations required to access resources and perform tasks is a very important issue in workflow management. Another important issue is handling workflow authorisation constraints between the workflow tasks. Current workflow authorisation models (Atluri et al., 2001; Bertino et al., 1999) assume a centralised workflow management system capable of managing workflow authorisations and handling workflow authorisation constraints. The major limitation in current workflow management systems models (Atluri et al., 2001; Bertino et al., 1999) is the requirement that all the roles and tasks in all the collaborating domains are known in advance by the workflow management system. This inherently requires the WFMS to have a global view of the collaboration environment, which is not feasible in a dynamic mediator-free environment with a large number of collaborating domains, where domains have a limited view of the collaboration environment and where domains dynamically join and leave the collaboration environment. Moreover, current WFMS models assume that the workflow manager is able to access and schedule any task to any role in any domain. With such assumptions the WFMS acts as a central mediator having precedence over all the access control policies of all the domains in the collaboration environment.
Handling workflow authorisation in fully distributed environments where none of the domains has a global view of the collaboration environment is a challenging task. In this paper, we propose a distributed workflow authorisation model where there is no central WFMS. We propose a task discovery protocol, which is used by a WFMS located at any of the collaborating domains, to discover authorised tasks that can be accessed from these domains. We provide an extended workflow authorisation constraints for authorisations in a mediator-free environment. We propose workflow authorisation mechanisms capable of assigning the minimal required authorisation to perform the required tasks. Our proposed framework is built on top of our SEcure Role mApping Technique (SERAT) for mediator-free environments to ensure secure interoperability (Shehab et al., 2005a,b) .
Contributions and paper organisation
The contributions in this paper can be summarised as follows:
• We present a workflow authorisation model for mediator-free multidomain collaboration environments.
• We provide an on-demand task discovery protocol that enables domains to discover tasks available through other domains using a distributed protocol, while respecting the access control policies of the involved domains.
• We define an extended model for workflow authorisation constraints to accommodate constraints involving access paths, tasks and sessions.
• We present three workflow authorisation problems:
-The Workflow Authorisation Problem (WAP): selects authorisations that satisfy the authorisation constraints.
-The Workflow Minimal Authorisation Problem (WMAP): selects minimal authorisations required to execute specified workflow tasks while at the same time satisfying the authorisation constraints.
-The Workflow Minimal Authorisation Problem with Path Overlaps (WMAPO): selects authorisations that can be shared for performing several tasks, and at the same time satisfies the same requirements of WMAP.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 3, we review the requirements of secure interoperability and the mediator-free secure collaboration. We introduce the challenges involved in workflow authorisation in mediator-free collaboration environments. In Section 4, we present the on-demand task discovery protocol. The workflow authorisation constraints are presented in Section 5. The workflow authorisation constraint satisfaction and optimisation problems are discussed in Section 6. The related work is presented in Section 7. Concluding remarks are added in Section 8.
Preliminaries
In our framework, we assume that all the domains adopt a Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model (Ferraiolo et al., 2001 (Ferraiolo et al., , 2003 to model their access control policies. The analysis performed in this paper can still be applied when other access control models are adopted. RBAC was chosen because it is suitable for specifying the security requirements for a wide range of commercial, medical, government applications (Bertino et al., 1999; Sandhu et al., 1996) and moreover it is being standardised. A domain that does not use RBAC as its access control model can easily generate an export RBAC policy to join the collaboration. In RBAC, permissions are associated with roles, and users are granted membership in appropriate roles, thereby acquiring the roles' permissions. The access control policy for domain D i is modelled as a directed graph G i = V i , A i where the vertex set V i represents roles and the arcs set A i represents the dominance relationship between roles. For example, if role r 1 dominates r 2 , (r 2 ≤ r 1 ), then (r 1 , r 2 ) ∈ A i . Thus, a user acquiring role r 1 can acquire permissions assigned to role r 2 by using the RBAC permission inheritance properties (Crampton, 2003 
Secure interoperability
According to Gong and'Qian (1994 , collaboration among n domains can be achieved by introducing cross domain pairwise mappings between roles in different domains. These mappings relate roles in different domains, and are represented by a set of cross domain arcs referred to as the set F (Figure 1 ). Solutions developed for schema matching in the area of heterogeneous database systems and more recently approaches based on ontologies (Madhavan and Halevy, 2003; Madhavan et al., 2005) can be used for generating such links. The details of such approaches are outside the scope of this paper. In this study, we assume that the cross domain mappings are selected by the administrators of the domains according to the interoperability requirements of each system. Furthermore, the system administrators agree on a set of restricted accesses which is similar to negative authorisations adopted in several access control models. The restricted access is a binary relation R on ∪ n i=1 V i such that ∀(u, v) ∈ R, u ∈ V i , v ∈ V j and i = j , where these edges in R are prohibited to exist during interoperation.
Given
. . , n, set of cross links F and a restricted access relation R, an interoperation Qian (1994, 1996) if it satisfies all the following conditions: 
Mediator-free secure collaboration
In a mediator-free collaboration environment, there is no central mediator or trusted party managing and ensuring secure interoperability among the collaborating domains. The mediator has a global view of all the access control policies of the collaborating domains and the cross links between them. A mediator-free collaboration is a completely distributed form of collaboration. In this environment, the domains have to collaborate in making access control decisions to avoid violations. In a mediator-free environment, none of the collaborating domains has the global view of all the access control policies; instead the domains view the collaboration environment only through their established cross links. In our previous work (Shehab et al., 2005a,b) , we presented a framework for secure collaboration in mediator-free multidomain environments (SERAT). This framework is based on using the access history to dynamically make access control decisions. The access history is referred to as the access path, which is the sequence of roles acquired from the home domain to target domains in the collaboration environment. Using the access path to make access control decisions shares ideas with the Chinese Wall security policy (Brewer and Nash, 1989) , as the access history controls future accesses. Using access path information when making access control decisions enables domains to prevent security violations as access requests are being made. Furthermore, it enables domains to make localised access control decisions without the need for the global view of the collaboration environment. SERAT provides a path authentication technique that generates signatures to prove the authenticity of access paths.
Workflow authorisation
A workflow is composed of a set of tasks, and a set of task dependencies that control the coordination among the tasks. WFMS provide facilities to define, manage, schedule and execute business processes by coordinating and controlling the flow of work and information between groups of interacting entities. The tasks in a workflow are carried out by several users in accordance with the organisational rules relevant to the process represented by the workflow. Roles in a domain represent agents that are able to perform certain tasks; we refer to the relationships between roles and tasks as the role-to-task assignments, which can easily be derived from the role-permission assignments in the RBAC model. The WFMSs locate a suitable set of roles that are able to execute the different workflow tasks. The workflow role specification is the association of roles with tasks in a workflow (Bertino et al., 1999) . The selection of roles to be associated with tasks is controlled by several workflow authorisation constraints; a common type of constraints are the separation of duty constraints (Clark and Wilson, 1987) .
Current WFMS models (Atluri et al., 2001; Bertino et al., 1999) assume that WFMS is a centralised mediator that has global view of all the roles and tasks available in the collaboration environment. Furthermore, in such WFMS models, collaboration among domains is only through the WFMS which is a very limited form of collaboration when compared to multihop collaboration in mediator-free environments. Figure 2 (a) shows the centralised WFMS in a collaboration environment, where there is a single central WFMS controlling the interaction among all the collaborating domains.
We propose a distributed WFMS framework in which each domain D i in the collaboration environment encloses its own WFMS; furthermore in each domain the WFMS is assigned a specific access role. Figure 2 (b) shows the distributed WFMS. In this framework, WFMS do not have a global view of the collaboration environment. Furthermore, the WFMS could only have access to roles in other domains via secure paths from its home domain to the target domain. The design of a WFMS capable of managing workflow authorisations in mediator-free environments has several challenging issues: C1 Task discovery: a WFMS in mediator-free environment has a limited view of the collaboration environment, thus a task discovery protocol is needed to discover tasks in other domains.
C2 Enforcing Path Constraints: in a mediator-free environment authorisations are acquired by generating access paths. Authorisation constraints inherently should be applied on access paths, thus WFMS should be extended to handle such constraints.
C3 Minimal Authorisation Assignment: in a mediator-free environment there are multiple paths to perform certain tasks, WFMS should be able to select the set of paths that minimise the required authorisations, or domains involved, in order to minimise the risks of security breaches.
In the following sections, we discuss each of the above challenges in detail, and propose suitable solutions for each challenge. 
Task path discovery
A workflow consists of several tasks that are to be executed according to a predefined sequence. WFMS should be able to discover roles in the collaboration environment that are able to execute the workflow tasks. Each domain D i in a mediator-free environment has a workflow management system WFMS i , with respect to which we assume the following: 
The WFMS in each domain is assigned an access role, this enables the WFMS to discover paths from this role to other roles able to execute all the workflow tasks. Following from the example in Figure 3 , we assume that the WFMS in domain A is assigned to role r A 1 . Figure 4 (a) shows an example workflow to be executed by the WFMS in domain A, and Figure 4 (b)-(f) show the paths from r A 1 to roles capable of executing tasks T 2 , T 9 , T 10 , T 7 and T 6 , respectively. This model is very suitable for scientific workflows, as it enables a user operating at a role of a 'scientist' to be able to execute a workflow by discovering paths to roles able to execute the intended tasks.
The paths discovered should respect the access control requirements of their involved domains. To ensure such requirements, we use the path linking rules and path authentication that were used by the SERAT framework for secure collaboration in mediator-free environments the interested reader is referred to Shehab et al. (2005a,b) . In this section, we present a task discovery protocol that enables domains to discover access paths to roles in other domains, whether reachable through one or more intermediate domains. The presented protocol is an on-demand path discovery, which is initiated only when domains require access paths to roles able to execute certain tasks.
On-demand task path discovery
The on-demand task discovery is initiated whenever a WFMS in a domain D i that is assigned a role r WF i needs to discover secure access paths to roles in other domains in the collaboration environment that are able to execute task t k . The task discovery protocol is composed of two types of messages, namely the path request and path reply messages. The domain D i generates a path request message requesting a path from role r WF i to a role able to execute t k and the request is sent on all its neighbouring domains through the outgoing cross links, referred to as
On receiving the path requests, the neighbouring domains check the authenticity of the received path signature generated by SERAT's path authentication technique. The path request is checked against SERAT's path linking rules to ensure that the path request does not violate the access control policy of the neighbouring domain. If the path request fails any of the above checks, then the request is dropped. Otherwise, the neighbouring domain appends the entry role to the received path, if the new path is able to execute task, t k , then a path reply is sent to the home domain D i , otherwise a path request is generated and forwarded to its neighbours. The path request propagates from domain to domain while obeying the access control requirements of each domain until the requested task is located. The home domain, D i , waits for a timeout period of T max , if no reply arrives within this period, then there are no secure paths from home domain to roles able to execute the requested task t k . The value of T max is assigned based on the number of collaborating domains.
The proposed protocol is similar to on-demand routing (Maltz et al., 1999; Perkins and Royer, 1999) ; however, task discovery is more complicated as it includes several other constraints such as the path linking rules and the task checking. To avoid path loops, which represent repeated authorisations, requests are not forwarded to domains already included in the currently accumulated path. To prevent the path size from increasing indefinitely, the path length is checked against a maximum path length (P max ) and if exceeded the request is dropped. Figure 5 shows the algorithm executed when domain D j receives a path request from a neighbouring domain, where P S and P D represent the path signature and domains included in path P , respectively. Figure 6 shows the different stages involved in the discovery of task T 6 from role r A 1 in domain A. Domain A sends a path requests REQ 1 and REQ 2 to domains B and C requesting task T 6 (see Figure 6(a) ). Domain B receives request REQ 1 and realises that r B 2 can execute task T 6 , so it sends a path reply REPLY 1 to A having an accumulated access path P 1 = {r A 1 , r A 3 , r B 1 , r B 2 } (see Figure 6(b) ). Domain C receives request REQ 2 and forwards it to its neighbouring domains, which include only domain B, (see Figure 6(b) ). On receiving REQ 2 , domain B sends a path reply REPLY 2 to A having an accumulated access path P 2 = {r A 1 , r A 2 , r C 1 , r C 3 , r B 2 }, see Figure 6 (c). Note that the presented protocol can be easily updated, with very minor changes, to return paths to a set of tasks instead of a single task. In such a case, a WFMS can discover access paths to all the required tasks by sending a single path request message.
The major advantage of on-demand task discovery is that it saves network bandwidth because it limits the amount of bandwidth consumed in the exchange of task discovery information by maintaining paths to only those target domains to which the domains need to collaborate with. The home domain could include constraints on the requested path, to further reduce the path discovery traffic. For example, the request could include a list of domains that should or should not be included in the path discovery. On-demand task discovery also obviates the need for disseminating path discovery information periodically, or flooding such information whenever a cross link changes or when a domain leaves or joins the collaboration environment. The primary problem is the large latency at the beginning of the collaboration caused by propagation of the path request message.
Workflow authorisation constraints
WFMS should be able to locate authorisations to execute the tasks included in the workflows to be executed. Furthermore, WFMS must ensure that authorisation constraints between the workflow different tasks are enforced. Authorisation constraints control the interaction between the tasks of a workflow. For example, the role assigned to task T i should be different from the role assigned to task T j . Authorisations in a mediator-free environment are acquired by generating access paths to roles in other domains. Thus, the workflow authorisation constraints should be enforced on the access paths and not only on roles as in current workflow authorisation systems (Atluri et al., 2001; Bertino et al., 1999) .
• Strict Path Constraints: a constraint on a path P = {r 1 , . . . , r n } implies a constraint on all the roles r i ∈ P . For example, give P i = {r • Weak Path Constraints: a constraint on a path P = {r 1 , . . . , r n } implies only a constraint on subset of the roles in P , for example, it can only be on the last role r n in the path.
Many researchers have highlighted the importance and use of Separation of Duty (SoD) constraints in RBAC models (Ferraiolo et al., 2001 (Ferraiolo et al., , 2003 Li et al., 2004 ) , and in workflow systems (Bertino et al., 1999) . In their simplest form, SoD constraints require that for a particular set of tasks, no single role be allowed to execute all tasks within the set. For example, the role authorising a payment should be different from the one issuing it. We extend the SoD constraints from the role level to include other levels such as access paths, tasks and sessions. Sessions allow more than one task to execute and share acquired authorisations, as will be discussed further in Section 6.2. The following presents the different levels that the SoD constraints could be applied:
• Path Level: SoD constraints could be of the form that a path P i should not include roles r i and r j . More generally, this constraint could require that the path P i should not include t or more roles in a set of m roles {r 1 , . . . , r m }.
• Task Level: task level SoD constraints ensure that paths assigned to different tasks do not overlap. Assuming tasks T i and T j are assigned to access paths P i and P j , respectively, then the constraints are enforced on the overlap or intersection of both paths, P i ∩ P j . More generally, this constraint could require that no more than t paths overlap in a set of m paths {P 1 , . . . , P m }. Furthermore, another form is that if task T i is executed by domain D i then task T j should be executed by a domain other than D i .
• Session Level: session level SoD constraints ensure that certain tasks are not included in the same session. For example tasks T i and T j should not be executed in the same session. More generally, this constraint could require that no more that t tasks are selected from a set of m tasks {T 1 , . . . , T m }.
Cardinality constraints could also be applied at the above levels. At the path level, path P i should not have more than t roles from a set of domains. At the task level, if path P i is assigned to task T i then the number of roles in P i should be less than some t. At the session level, session S k should include at most t. Other types of constraints enforce orderings among roles, paths and tasks. The above constraints are applied to the workflow to constitute the workflow authorisation constraints.
Workflow authorisation problems
Authorisations in a mediator-free environment are acquired by establishing access paths. WFMS use the path discovery protocol to discover access paths able to execute the workflow tasks. The workflow constraints define the authorisation constraints among the workflow tasks. The workflow authorisation problem is informally defined as the problem of assigning access paths, which represent authorisations, to the workflow tasks such that all the workflow constraints are satisfied. We define the Workflow Authorisation Problem (WAP) as follows: The WAP is a Constraint Satisfaction Problem (CSP), which can be solved using CSP techniques (Marriott and Stuckey, 1998; Dechter, 2003) . The problem is solved locally by the domain's WFMS after path discovery is completed. The solution of the WAP satisfies all the workflow constraints; however, the solution has no optimisation criteria controlling the number of the acquired authorisations or roles acquired through the established access paths. In other words, the solution to the WAP is not guaranteed to satisfy the Principle of Least Privilege (Saltzer and Schroeder, 1975) , which requires that each principal be accorded the minimum access privileges needed to accomplish its task. In the context of the WAP, the principle of least privilege implies choosing access paths that minimise the path authorisations. The following sections provide solutions that ensure that this principle is satisfied.
Minimal workflow authorisation
Assume each role r i is assigned a positive cost r i .c; this cost is assigned by the WFMS solving the optimisation problem. The cost could represent several metrics; for example, it could represent the degree of trust between the WFMS domain and the domain where the role resides, or it could be based on the effort involved in establishing trust with the domain of role r i . The role costs could be fixed or dynamically assigned based on the reputation of the respective domains in the collaboration environment. An access path is a sequence of roles; we define the cost of an access path as follows:
Definition 2: Let P = {r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r n } be an access path, and r i .c denote the cost of role r i . The cost of path P is defined as follows:
Note that, when all the role costs r i c are set to a constant β then the path cost (P ) = β|P |, which is proportional to the path length |P |, with equality when β = 1. To satisfy the principle of least privilege the optimisation problem formulated should minimise the cost of the access paths selected. We define the WMAP as follows:
Definition 3: WMAP. Given a workflow W , comprised of n tasks T = {T 1 , . . . , T n } to be executed sequentially, such that each task T i has m i discovered access paths
}, and a set of workflow constraints C = {c 1 , . . . , c q }. Find the workflow task path labelling W P A = {P 1 * , . . . , P n * }, where
and satisfies all the constraints in C.
The WMAP is an optimisation problem that chooses access paths having low costs; in other words, if all the role costs are set to 1, then the optimisation problem would choose the shortest access paths. Shortest paths are paths having the least number of roles, which implies the paths with the least privileges. Also note that the solution of the optimisation problem is affected by the assigned role costs r i .c, this enables the WFMS to indicate its role preferences. For example, if the WFMS favour certain roles then it should assign to them low costs and high costs if otherwise. In what follows we formulate the WMAP as an integer program. For each path P i j ∈ P i for task T i , we introduce a decision variable x ij ∈ {0, 1}, where x ij = 1 if path P i j is assigned to task T i and x ij = 0 otherwise. Figure 7 shows the association of decision variables with paths and tasks. The problem is formulated as follows:
The objective function we are minimising is the sum of all the paths assigned to the tasks, note that x ij is multiplied by (P i j ) to account only for the assigned paths. The first constraint ensures that each task is assigned only a single path. The remaining constraints ensure that all the workflow constraints c l ∈ C are also satisfied. The formulated problem is not only a constraint satisfaction problem; instead it seeks to satisfy the constraints as well as to find paths with minimal costs. To solve this optimisation problem, techniques for constrained integer programming (Nemhauser and Wolsey, 1988) and resource allocation (Ibaraki and Katoh, 1988) could be used. Note that the presented optimisation problem is solved at a localised level by the WFMS in each domain without the need for a global view of the collaboration environment. 
WMAP with path overlaps
The WMAP provides a minimal path assignment to tasks in the workflow; however, it assumes that tasks are assigned paths without investigating savings that could be gained by the sharing established paths among different tasks. To investigate further possible optimisations, we introduce sessions in which multiple tasks can share authorisations by making use of path overlaps among paths assigned to the tasks in the same session. A session is composed of a Set of Tasks (ST ), which is a subset of the workflow tasks, and a session lifecycle that indicates the sequence in which the tasks in ST should be executed and the sequence in which their access paths are to be generated. A session S k is composed of tasks {T 
For example, if P u = {r 1 , r 2 , r 3 , r 4 , r 5 , r 6 } and P v = {r 1 , r 2 , r 3 , r 7 , r 8 , r 5 , r 6 }, then σ (P u , P v ) = {r 1 , r 2 , r 3 }. Note that, if P v is to be established after P u then the overlap σ (P u , P v ) could be used as it was already established for P u , and only P v \ σ (P u , P v ) need to be established to generate P v . Exploiting such overlap among paths of consecutive tasks in the same session makes it possible to use already acquired roles and obviates the need for reestablishing acquired authorisations. Figure 8 shows a session composed of four tasks {T 
Path sharing is possible if multiple tasks share the same session while respecting any constraints enforced on these sessions, such as SoD constraints related to sessions, for example, Task T i and T j should not be performed in the same session. We define the Workflow Minimal Authorisation Problem with path Overlaps (WMAPO) problem as follows. In what follows, we formulate the WMAPO as an integer program which accommodates both path selection and task-session assignment. We assign each task T i a decision variable y ik , where y ik = 1 if task T i is assigned to session k and y ik = 0 otherwise. The problem is formulated as follows: = 2} ensures that the overlap is computed only for consecutive tasks in similar sessions. Figure 9 (a) shows an example session-task assignment, and Figure 9 (b) shows the evaluation of the indicator function for session S 1 . The multiplier α > 0 allows the WFMS to steer the objective of the optimisation problem. For example, assigning high α > 1 will generate paths with high overlap but no necessarily path with minimal cost. This, α controls the effect of the overlap on the optimisation problem. The second constraint ensures that each task is assigned to only a single session. All the other constraints are similar to the constraints of WMAP.
Note that the session life cycle for a session S k can be extracted from the solution vector y ik , i = 1, . . . , n, because the sequence in which the task assigned to session S k indicated in the vector, for example from Figure 9 (a), the solution vector of session S 1 , is [y 11 , . . . , y 91 ] = [1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0]. Thus, the session life cycle is {T 1 , T 3 , T 7 } which is shown in Figure 9 (b). Bertino et al. (1999) proposed a workflow authorisation model capable of specifying and enforcing workflow authorisation constraints, the model assumes a central WFMS having full knowledge of all the users, roles and tasks in the collaboration environment. Altintas et al. (2004) proposed a distributed workflow execution model based on the Chinese Wall security model; however, the workflow authorisation is controlled by a central system, which has a global view of the collaboration environment. Similarly, Muth et al. (1998) proposed a WFMS, where the workflow specification is centralised and the workflow execution is distributed.
Related work

Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented a mediator-free workflow authorisation model where each domain in the collaboration environment encloses its own WFMS. Furthermore, we have presented a task discovery protocol that would enable domains with a limited view of the collaboration environment to discover secure paths to tasks in other domains in the collaboration environment. We have also defined an extended model for workflow authorisation constraints. The model would be able to accommodate constraints involving access paths, tasks and sessions.
Our workflow authorisation problem was formulated as a constraint satisfaction problem that selects paths that satisfy all the authorisation constraints. Specifically, we proposed the WMAP that utilises the minimal authorisations required to execute the workflow tasks, while at the same time satisfying all the workflow authorisation constraints. We showed that by selecting the paths at minimal costs, the WMAP is consistent with the principle of least privilege. Furthermore, we investigated path overlaps among access paths, which allowed us to add path overlaps to our WMAP and formulated the WMAP with overlaps. The WMAPO targeted assigning tasks with overlapping paths to the same sessions and at the same time ensuring minimal paths. Finally, we formulated integer programs to solve the WMAP as well as the WMAPO.
